Concerns have intensified over the management of Ghana gold reserves and the operations of the Gold-for-Oil and Gold-for-Reserves programmes under the
Concerns have intensified over the management of Ghana gold reserves and the operations of the Gold-for-Oil and Gold-for-Reserves programmes under the National Democratic Congress (NDC)-led administration, following analyses by Bright Simons of IMANI Africa and related reports emerging in early 2026.
According to Bright Simons, Ghana has witnessed a sharp reduction in physical gold reserves since the government transition, with figures reportedly dropping from over 30 tonnes to significantly lower levels within a short period.
He suggests that these reductions reflect the rapid liquidation of accumulated reserves rather than ordinary operational turnover, raising questions about the effectiveness and transparency of the GoldBod initiative, the government’s strategic agency overseeing gold trade.
In a detailed article, Bright Simons has particularly criticized the “commercial” losses attributed to timing mismatches in the Gold-for-Reserves programme.
While the programme is designed to convert gold into foreign exchange for critical imports such as fuel, Simons noted that the lack of public disclosure and opaque mechanisms governing sales—including the use of unknown brokers and intermediaries—has exposed the programme to financial “leakages,” with some estimates exceeding GH¢2 billion.
The criticism also touches on structural inefficiencies within GoldBod.
Bright Simons argued that the institution’s operational setup has not matched claims of economic benefit, particularly when accounting for high acquisition costs, risks associated with small-scale and artisanal mining, and the persistence of illegal gold mining (galamsey) which continues to dominate the gold supply chain.
In tandem with these concerns, Ghana has recently embarked on a local gold refining initiative, a historic step intended to retain more value from mineral exports and capture higher foreign exchange earnings.
The initiative, involving the Gold Coast Refinery and South Africa’s Rand Refinery, is designed to process at least one metric tonne of gold weekly, with plans for scaling up as capacity improves.
However, industry observers warn that refining without a fully operational traceability system could compromise Ghana’s ability to attract premium international buyers.
While GoldBod has launched a pilot traceability project covering 600 mines to ensure that gold supplied to the refinery is legally and sustainably sourced, critics caution that the system is still in its infancy.
A majority of the artisanal mining gold—98.8 percent—continues to be exported to markets such as Dubai and India, where sourcing rules are less stringent, often resulting in discounted prices.
Only a minimal fraction reaches markets with stricter standards, including Switzerland, South Africa, China, and the USA, with no gold exported to the UK.
The combination of depleted reserves, opaque GoldBod operations, and the challenges of traceable refining underscores systemic vulnerabilities in the gold sector.
While Ghana earned nearly $21 billion from gold exports in 2025, half of that came from small-scale mining operations under GoldBod management, highlighting the strategic importance of effective governance, transparency, and traceability.
Simons’ analysis reflects broader anxieties among economists, financial analysts, and civil society about the capacity to manage its gold resources efficiently while preventing economic losses, reputational risks, and environmental damage from unregulated mining.
The reports serve as a reminder that while policies like Gold-for-Reserves aim to stabilize foreign exchange and strengthen the economy, their success depends on transparency, prudent management, and rigorous oversight.
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